Building A Comprehensive Australia-Asean Maritime Partnership In A Changing Indo-Pacific Order

Abstract

The Australia-ASEAN maritime partnership faces both practical opportunities and strategic tensions. This paper analyzes maritime security cooperation following the 2024 ASEAN Australia Special Summit, using a 'role conflict' framework to assess how Australia 
balances its 'middle power' support for ASEAN multilateralism with its 'minilateral ally' posture (AUKUS, Quad). From an ASEAN-centric, Indonesian naval practitioner's perspective, it examines three pillars: (1) the Blue Economy foundation; (2) the security 
spectrum from Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated (IUU) fishing to naval interoperability; and (3) the institutional challenge AUKUS poses to ASEAN Centrality. This 'role conflict' framework explains Australia's strategic behaviour as an attempt to use 'middle power' engagement to mitigate the diplomatic friction caused by its 'minilateral ally' posture. The paper argues Australia's strategy to manage this 'role conflict' (using 'middle power' funding to offset 'minilateral ally' friction) is viable but tenuous. Partnership resilience will be determined not by high-end naval ('grey-hull') cooperation, fractured by AUKUS, but by foundational trust built through civilian law enforcement ('white-hull') and scientific ('blue') channels. While AUKUS creates friction, new initiatives like the AUD $64 million Southeast Asia Maritime Partnerships Initiative offer crucial confidence-building pathways. The paper concludes with policy recommendations focused on 'white-hull' over 'grey-hull' cooperation, including tailored capacity-building and a formal Track 1.5 dialogue, to ensure the partnership strengthens, not undermines, the ASEAN-led regional architecture.